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Abstract 
The Ongoing Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Does the P300 Reflect 
Conscious Perception Or Its Consequences? 
A common scientific strategy towards understanding consciousness is to study neural 
correlates of consciousness (NCC) for a particular conscious percept. It can be done by 
contrasting conditions in which subjects are aware and unaware of a particular visual 
stimulus. However, recent findings have been contradictory and this approach appears not to 
reveal only the NCC, but also the prerequisites or consequences of consciousness. The goal 
of the present study was to investigate whether the P300 component often claimed to be a key 
signature of conscious access might actually rather reflect the consequences of conscious 
perception. Twenty-one healthy subjects participated in the EEG experiment where most of 
the stimuli were clearly perceived and only a quartile of trials was associated with not 
perceiving the target. The visual masking paradigm used no discrimination task, always the 
same stimulus was presented and the additional task was given together with the target 
stimulus. Results indicate that trials where subjects reported to have seen the stimulus are 
associated with a higher P300. Hence, the present data support the theories, which claim that 
P300 is a marker of conscious perception. 
 Keywords: neural correlates of consciousness, task relevance, P300, EEG, visual 
masking 
 
Kokkuvõte 
Teadvuse neuraalsete korrelaatide otsingul: Kas P300 komponent peegeldab 
teadvuselamust või või teadvustamise tagajärgi?  
Laialdaselt aktsepteeritud viis teadvuse teaduslikuks mõistmiseks on uurida teadvuse 
neuraalseid korrelaate (TNK), mis on seotud mingi kindla teadvuselamusega. Seda on 
võimalik teha vastandades omavahel tingimusi, kus mingit kindlat visuaalset stiimulit 
teadvustatakse või ei teadvustata. Senised uuringud on aga andnud vastuolulisi tulemusi, mis 
viitab asjaolule, et antud meetod võib lisaks TNKdele välja tuua ka teadvustamisele eelnevaid 
või järgnevaid protsesse. Käesoleva uurimistöö eesmärgiks oli uurida kas teadvuse 
signatuuriks peetav P300 komponent on seotud teadvuselamusega või mõne sellele järgneva 
protsessiga. Kakskümmend üks tervet katseisikut osalesid EEG katses, kus suurem osa 
katsekordadest teadvustati stiimulit selgelt ning ainult veerandil juhtudest jäi sihtobjekt 
teadvustamata. Visuaalse maskeerimise katseparadigmas ei kasutatud eristusülesannet, 
rakendati ühte ja sama stiimulit ning lisaülesanet. Katses kogutud andmed näitasid, et P300 
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komponent peegeldab teadvuselamust. Seega toetavad antud katsetulemused teooriat, et P300 
on teadvustamise korrelaat. 
Märksõnad: teadvuse neuraalsed korrelaadid, teadvuselamus, ülesande olulisus, P300, 
EEG, visuaalne maskeerimine 
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Introduction 
 
A central goal in the scientific study of consciousness is to find the minimal set of 
neurophysiological processes that are jointly sufficient for a particular conscious percept 
(Crick & Koch, 1990; Aru, Bachmann, Singer, Melloni, 2012). To detect the minimal set of 
neural processes as the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) the widely accepted 
contrastive method is to compare brain activity in conditions where subjects perceive or do 
not perceive the stimuli. However, despite the apparently straightforward logic of this 
approach the results are inconclusive and contradictory (Aru et al., 2012). It has been argued 
that the main reason for why one has failed to find universally accepted signatures of NCC is 
that the experimental methods typically used to study NCC are not specific for NCC but 
rather also unravel neural processes that precede or follow conscious experience. In other 
words, contrasting trials with and without conscious perception of a particular target gives us 
more processes than just the NCC or the signature of the NCC (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf, 
Hsieh, Sack, 2012). Depending on how visual awareness is manipulated and assessed, neural 
prerequisites (NCC-pr) and neural consequences (NCC-co) may be confused with the NCC 
proper (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012; Pitts, Padwal, Fennelly, Martínez, Hillyard, 
2014a; Pitts, Metzler, Hillyard, 2014b). For example differences in attention, stimulus 
expectation, adaptation or storing in working memory could bring out differences between 
trials with and without conscious perception of a target (Aru et al., 2012).  
This argument implies that the contrastive analysis has not offered any conclusive 
evidence for a consistent understanding of signatures of conscious perception. Hence, one has 
to re-evaluate the whole literature, as it is not known which part of the previous results 
reflects NCC and which part corresponds to the prerequisites for or consequences of 
conscious perception. Further, the fact that we cannot be sure about those previous findings 
implies that some of the neurobiological theories about consciousness might also be based 
more on the results reflecting prerequisites or consequences than on those directly associated 
with the conscious percept. 
One of the most popular theories of the NCC is the global neuronal workspace theory 
(Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, Sergent, 2006; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; 
Dehaene, Charles, King, Marti, 2014). According to this theory the key signature of 
information accessing consciousness is the P300 component of the event related potential 
(ERP). P300 is a positive component often observed on the parietal electrodes, which starts 
around 300 milliseconds after stimulus onset. In the present work we argue that the P300 
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component often claimed to be a key signature of conscious access (Del Cul, Baillet, 
Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2014) might actually rather 
reflect the consequences of conscious perception. We first try to explain which consequences 
of conscious perception might be captured by P300. Based on these theoretical ideas we 
construct an experiment to directly test whether the P300 indexes conscious perception or 
rather the consequences of it. 
Which consequences of consciously perceiving a stimulus might the P300 reflect? For 
intuitive understandings of these processes consider the experimental situation the subject is 
in. The perceptual tasks are usually demanding and, as the subjects often report during and 
after the experiment, frustrating for them because the stimuli are very hard to perceive. It is of 
course the goal of these experimental setups to keep the subjects well below good recognition 
performance simply to be able to collect enough trials where the target is consciously not 
perceived. Thus, in these experiments the subjects perceive the target only very faintly or do 
not perceive the target stimulus at all for most of the trials. This claim is illustrated by low 
subjective visibility ratings in many of such experiments (e.g. Table 1 in Aru & Bachmann, 
2009a or Figure 2E in Del Cul et al., 2007 for some data). This implies that a trial where the 
subjects perceive the stimulus more or less clearly is a deviant trial, as it is different from all 
the trials where the subject has hard time to perceive anything. Thus, these kinds of trials with 
more or less clear perception might be exactly the kind of stimulation that leads to the classic 
P300 response: as there are a few trials where subjects clearly perceive the stimulus, these 
trials elicit the P300, because they are somewhat surprising to the subject. Hence, when in the 
end trials with and without conscious perception of stimulus are compared, the P300 
amplitude will be one of their differences. But not because it is a signature of conscious 
perception but rather because clearly perceived trials are deviants associated with the classic 
P300 response. 
Hence, the first consequence of conscious perception that P300 might reflect is the 
surprise response stemming from the fact that clearly perceived trials are rare in common 
experimental setups used to probe for the NCC. Clearly these claims are speculative at first, 
but they lead to clear predictions that can be tested in experiments: in a paradigm where most 
of the stimuli are clearly perceived and only a quartile of trials is associated with not 
perceiving the stimulus, a stronger P300 should be measured for those trials where the target 
was not consciously perceived. In this case, the P300 would be more pronounced for trials 
without conscious perception of the target. 
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However, this experiment would fail simply because trials with conscious perception 
could also be associated with other post-perceptual processes beyond the detection of 
deviants. Indeed, we ourselves think that the main reason why P300 accompanies trials with 
conscious perception is not because trials with conscious perception are deviants but because 
in those trials working memory content has to be updated and this process is indexed by the 
P300 (Polich, 2007; 2012). Namely in most studies (e.g. Aru & Bachmann, 2009a; Del Cul et 
al., 2007) subjects are in addition to performing the subjective visibility task required to give 
responses about the identity of the stimulus (so that the accuracy or d-prime etc could be 
measured). This brings an unwanted confound. When subjects perceive the stimulus 
consciously, they can identify it and hold its identity in working memory until the response 
screen appears. However, when the subject does not perceive the stimulus consciously, this 
memory trace is much more feeble – unconscious memory traces decay fast and are 
qualitatively different from consciously maintaining information (Greenwald, Draine, 
Abrams, 1996; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Thus, trials with and without conscious 
perception differ with regard to updating and maintaining information about the stimulus 
until the response screen appears. Updating working memory content is also known to be one 
of the fundamental processes underlying P300 (Polich, 2007; 2012) and therefore the P300 
will be more pronounced when the stimulus is consciously perceived. 
How could this intuition be experimentally tested? At first it seems that if this 
conjecture is correct, having only a subjective visibility task without a discrimination task 
would eliminate this difference between trials with and without conscious perception. This is 
not enough, however, as working-memory update could still occur differently between 
conditions when many different stimuli are presented. In particular, on the trials where the 
stimuli are clearly perceived, the identity of the target can be updated in the working memory 
(Polich, 2007; 2012), whereas this is not the case for the trials without conscious perception. 
Thus, one should use an experimental task where one and the same stimulus is presented so 
that no working memory update is necessary. 
Therefore, another consequence that P300 might reflect is the update of working 
memory. To get around this confound, we use an experimental setup where there is no 
discrimination task and where one and the same stimulus is presented all the time. The 
subjects are required to respond whether they perceived this stimulus on each trial. To make 
sure that they are not responding randomly we also include catch trials where no target 
stimulus is included. 
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Finally, Michael Pitts and colleagues (2014a; 2014b) have argued that P300 could be 
related to reporting the contents of consciousness. These authors have elegantly shown that 
when subjects do not have to provide information about stimuli, i.e. these stimuli are task-
irrelevant, P300 is not observed for trials with conscious perception. When the same stimuli 
are task-relevant, a prominent P300 is measured for trials with conscious perception. In other 
words, these authors observe that the amplitude of the P300 shows an interaction between 
conscious perception and task relevance. Pitts et al. (2014a; 2014b) claim that P300 is a 
consequence of consciousness that reflects the need to report about task-relevant stimuli. In 
their experiments in the “task-irrelevant” condition subjects simply did not have to report 
about the stimuli, i.e. those stimuli could have been ignored. In the present experiment we 
wanted to test for a similar effect by having subjects count either the perceived or the 
unperceived trials, hence making either perceived or unperceived trials task relevant.  
All in all, in this study, to exclude working memory update, we use an experimental 
setup with no discrimination task and always the same stimulus. We also make sure that there 
would be more trials where subjects perceive the target clearly and only 1/4 of trials with no 
conscious perception of the target. Thus, in this study we hypothesize that the P300 
component, which is thought to be the key signature of conscious access, might actually 
rather reflect the consequences of conscious perception. In particular we claim that in our 
paradigm a stronger P300 should be measured for those trials where the target was not 
consciously perceived. Finally our hypothesis is that our manipulation of task-relevance 
through the counting task would interact with the P300 results, thus confirming earlier results 
(Pitts et al., 2014a; 2014b). 
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Materials and Methods 
 
Subjects 
21 subjects participated in the EEG experiment, of whom 7 subjects participated in 
the pilot experiment but not in the main experiment. The data from 3 additional subjects were 
not included in the final analyses due to a low percentage of trials where the stimulus was 
perceived or a high percentage of trials where the subjects reported to have seen the target for 
catch trials. The remaining 11 participants (4 male) were 26 - 48 years old (mean = 30.6, 
median = 28, SD = 7.3). They were considered to be in good health and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. One of them was left-handed. All the included subjects had 52 - 
289 trials in each condition (m = 142, median = 145, SD = 34). On the experiment day, 
participants were instructed to avoid drinking coffee. All participants were recruited as 
volunteers and gave informed consent prior to the beginning of the experiment. The study 
was approved by the ethics committee of University of Tartu and the experiment was 
undertaken in compliance with national legislation and the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
Stimuli 
The experiment was programmed using the Python programming language and the 
VisionEgg package. The target stimulus was a gray @ sign. The mask consisted of a square 
filled with random noise. More specifically, on every trial, each of the 255x255 pixels in the 
mask square was filled randomly with one of 256 possible gray levels. Thus, the mask 
stimulus was updated for every trial independently. Fig. 1. Depicts the target stimulus and the 
mask. Stimuli were presented on a light gray background with a luminance of 51.6 cd/m2. 
The luminance of the stimuli was 48.5 cd/m2 on average (median = 49.5 cd/m2, SD = 1.25 
cd/m2, range = 46.5 – 51 cd/m2). The size of the target stimulus was 1.8 degrees of visual 
angle and the size of the mask was 2.7 degrees of visual angle. Prior to the stimulus a fixation 
cross was presented. The size of the fixation cross was 0.3 degrees of visual angle and its 
luminance was 11.4 cd/m2. And the response screen contained the question “Did you see the 
target object?” in the Estonian language (luminance of 24 cd/m2). 
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Figure 1. Sequence of the paradigm (fixation cross, blank screen, target stimulus, mask). Images are illustrative 
and not on the same scale. 
 
In order to achieve the desired rate of perception for the target stimulus two 
parameters of the experiment were adjusted separately for each participant. First, a suitable 
inter stimulus interval (ISI) between stimulus and mask was determined. Second, the 
luminance of the target stimulus was continuously adjusted in order to keep the detection rate 
approximately at the desired level. The suitable ISI was determined with the help of a short 
pre-experiment prior to the main experiment. The pre-experiment was very similar to the 
main experiment (see Task and design) where subjects had to report whether they perceived a 
stimulus on each trial. Importantly, stimuli were presented with four different ISIs (1-4 
frames or 10, 20, 30 or 40 ms) relative to mask onset while the stimulus duration (10 ms) and 
luminance (48.5 cd/m2) were kept constant. Every ISI was presented 10 times and 10 
additional catch trials where no stimulus was present were also included. After this short pre-
experiment resulting detection rates were displayed on the computer screen. The ISI that lead 
to a detection rate closest to 75% was then chosen by the experimenter for the main 
experiment for this particular subject. The experimenter also checked whether the amount of 
false positives for catch trials was sufficiently low. 
Because the detection rate for the chosen ISI was rarely optimal (sufficiently closest 
to 75%) after the first pre-experiment, a second pre-experiment was conducted where the 
luminance of the target stimulus was varied in order to improve the detection rate. The 
luminance level of the target stimulus was controlled with the QUEST algorithm (Watson & 
Pelli, 1983) as implemented by Denis Pelli and made available on the VisionEgg website 
(http://visionegg.org/Quest/). The second pre-experiment was again very similar to the main 
experiment (see Task and design) comprising 100 trials of which 20 were catch trials. It was 
expected that at the end of this block the QUEST algorithm would have helped to arrive at an 
adequate estimate of stimulus luminance that would lead to approximately 75% detection. 
Indeed, this was mostly the case. Unfortunately, however, in pilot studies it was observed that 
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detection rates did not stay stable over the course of the main experiment once stimulus 
luminance was fixed after the second pre-experiment. Thus, we decided not to fix stimulus 
luminance, but to keep the QUEST algorithm active during the main experiment as well. We 
hoped that this would lead to a more equal and stable detection rate for all the blocks of the 
main experiment. In light of this procedure the main purpose of the second pre-experiment 
was to allow the QUEST algorithm to settle in. 
 
Task and design 
Subjects were seated in a dark room, 90 cm from the monitor (SUN CM751U; 
1024x768 pixels; 100 Hz refresh rate). Each session began with 2 short pre-experiments to 
determine the appropriate ISI and target stimulus luminance for each subject (see Stimuli), 
followed by the main experiment. The main experiment comprised 800 trials in total, 100 in 
each experimental block. 64 of those trials (8 in each block) were catch trials where no target 
stimulus was presented. The order of the trials was fully randomized. Each trial began with 
the presentation of a fixation cross in the middle of the screen for 500 ms (see Figure 1). The 
fixation cross was followed by a blank screen for a random duration between 750 - 1250 ms. 
Then the target stimulus was presented in the middle of the screen for 10 ms, followed by a 
blank screen for a fixed ISI set individually for each subject as described above (m = 25.5, 
median = 30, SD = 9.3, range = 10 - 40 ms). Subsequently, the mask stimulus was presented 
for 500 ms and thereafter the blank screen again for 500 ms. Finally, the response screen 
appeared.  
Subjects were instructed to fixate on the cross in the middle of the screen, not to blink 
until the response screen had appeared, and then to report via button press on a standard 
keyboard whether they had perceived the target stimulus on a given trial (“seen” response) or 
not (“unseen” response). Seen and unseen responses were given with different hands and 
there was a break after every 100 trials. 
In order to replicate results of recent studies (Pitts et al., 2014a; 2014b), an additional 
task was given together with the stimulus: to count the number of either seen or unseen trials 
within a single session. In each experimental session (100 trials), subjects were asked to 
count alternately either seen or unseen trials. Almost half (6) of the participants began to 
count from seen and others (5) from unseen trials. Counted number was entered at the end of 
each session using the keyboard.  
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EEG recording and preprocessing  
The experiments were carried out in a laboratory room equipped with the Nexstim 
eXimia EEG-system with 60-carbon electrodes cap (Nextim Ltd., Finland). In every 
recording, 11 electrodes (PO4, POZ, PO3, P4, P2, PZ, P1, P3, CP2, CP1, CZ) of the extended 
10-20 system were used according to the electrode positions (Sharbrough, Chatrian, Lesser, 
Lüders, Nuwer, Picton, 1991). Simultaneously with the EEG, eye movements were recorded 
with two extra horizontal HEOG electrodes placed approximately 10 mm from the outer 
canthis of both eyes. The reference electrode was placed on the forehead, slightly to the right. 
Through constant monitoring, the impedance at all electrodes was kept below 15 KΩ. The 
EEG signals were sampled at 1450 Hz and amplified with a gain of 2000. The bandwidth of 
the signal was ca. 0.1 – 350 Hz. 
EEG data were preprocessed with Matlab toolbox Fieldtrip 
(http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl; version 01-04-2014). Data were epoched around stimulus onset 
(-200 to +700 ms). Epochs were baseline corrected with a 100 ms time period before stimulus 
onset and data were filtered with a 30 Hz low-pass zero phase shift Butterworth filter. All 
epochs were inspected manually for artifacts and epochs containing blinks, eye movements, 
strong muscle activity or other artifacts were removed from the analysis. Noisy signals were 
interpolated with the nearest neighbor method if possible. On average less than 1% of the 
data were interpolated (median = 0%, SD = 1.1%, range = 0 – 3 %). 
 
Data analysis 
The behavioral analysis was carried out with the R programming language 
(http://www.r-project.org; version 0.98.1028). EEG data were analyzed with Matlab toolbox 
Fieldtrip (version 01-04-2014) as well as with R. Repeated measures ANOVA and paired t-
tests were used for both behavioral and mean amplitude analysis. Effect sizes are reported as 
ges (generalized eta squared) or Cohen’s d, respectively.   
 
Analysis of ERP amplitudes 
After the preprocessing, ERP’s were computed for all subjects in all conditions (count 
seen/ seen, count seen/ unseen, count unseen/ seen, count unseen/ unseen). The P300 
component was determined on a grand average over all subjects and all conditions. First, the 
most representative channels for the P300 component were selected. PZ and its surrounding 
channels (PO4, POZ, PO3, P4, P2, P1, P3) showed the highest P300 amplitudes. Thus, data 
from these channels were averaged for further analysis. Next, the peak P300 latency was 
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derived from this grand average. The maximal positive peak was found at 439 ms. Finally, 
mean peak amplitude was calculated +/- 50 ms around the peak latency. In other words, data 
from each individual ERP were averaged between 389 - 489 ms (439 +/- 50 ms) after 
stimulus presentation. 
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Results 
 
Behavioral results 
The goal of this experimental setup was to keep subjects’ detection rate close to 75% 
and thereby make trials where the target is consciously not perceived deviant trials. In order 
to achieve the desired detection rate two parameters of the experiment were adjusted. First, 
the experimenter determined a suitable ISI between stimulus and mask. Second, the QUEST 
algorithm continuously adjusted the luminance of the target stimulus.  
 The false alarm rate was satisfactory: 4 % on average (median = 3%, SD = 4%, range 
= 0 – 14 %). On average the detection rate was 73 % (median = 73%, SD = 5%, range = 67 – 
80 %) and it did not vary much depending on the counting condition. The average detection 
rate for blocks in which seen trials were counted was 74 % (median = 75%, SD = 5%, range 
= 63 – 80 %). For blocks where unseen trials were counted average detection rate was 72 % 
(median = 73%, SD = 7%, range = 58 – 80 %). A paired t-test between the mean detection 
rate for these different types of blocks did not reveal a significant difference (t(10) = 1.3, p = 
0.24, d = 0.38). 
The detection rates described above are somewhat distorted by some blocks where the 
detection rate dropped below 60% (9% of all available data). Thus, it makes sense to remove 
these blocks because they do not fit with the rationale of the experiment. After doing so the 
average detection rate for blocks where seen trials were counted was 75 % (median = 75%, 
SD = 4%, range = 69 – 80 %). For blocks where unseen trials were counted the average 
detection rate was 74 % (median = 75%, SD = 5%, range = 64 – 80 %). Again, a paired t-test 
between the mean detection rate for these different types of blocks did not reveal a significant 
difference (t(10) = 1.3, p = 0.21, d = 0.4). 
One more aspect to consider was the varying contrast (i.e. the gray level; values 
ranging between 1-256) of the target stimulus over the course of the experiment. Potentially 
the contrast could have been different between different conditions. The average gray level 
over subjects was 204 (median = 207, SD = 12, range = 182 – 219). Within subjects the gray 
levels varied over conditions 0.38 points on average (median = 0.39, SD = 0.18, range = 0.11 
- 0.79). A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test whether gray levels are 
systematically different for seen and unseen trials depending on the counting condition. The 
main effect for counting condition was not significant (F(1,10) < 1.0). The main effect for 
target detection was significant (F(1,10) = 9.4, p = 0.01, ges = 1.6e-05). And the interaction 
between the two factors was not significant (F(1,10) < 1.0). The main effect for target 
DOES THE P300 REFLECT CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION OR ITS CONSEQUENCES?  
 
14  
detection may seem problematic, because it could mean that target detection was caused by 
external factors (i.e. contrast) and the corresponding EEG analyses are not justified. Note, 
however, that the effect size for this main effect is very small. And indeed the absolute 
differences in contrast between “seen” and “unseen” trials within subjects are virtually absent 
(m = 0.09, median = 0.05, SD = 0.11, range = 0.001 – 0.39). Nevertheless, the significant 
difference of the contrasts needs to be taken into account in the EEG analysis. 
 
EEG results 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether P300 amplitude is dependent 
only on conscious perception of the stimulus or whether P300 amplitude also (or even more) 
reflects post-perceptual processes such as working memory update.  
Firstly, two-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on mean P300 
amplitudes (see methods for more details). The first factor was counting condition (subject 
counted seen or unseen trials) and the second factor was target detection (target seen or 
unseen on a given trial). Fig. 2 depicts the grand average ERP's for all four conditions.  
 
 
Figure 2. The grand average ERP's for all four conditions (count seen/ seen, count seen/ unseen, count unseen/ 
seen, count unseen/ unseen) separately. As evidenced on the figure, trials where subjects reported to have seen 
the stimulus are associated with a higher P300 independently of the counting condition. 
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The main effect of counting condition was not significant (F(1,10) < 1.0) and the 
main effect for target detection was significant (F(1,10) = 11.5, p = 0.007, ges = 0.08). 
However, despite all our manipulations trials with conscious perception (“seen” trials) still 
were associated with stronger P300 than the trials without conscious perception (“unseen” 
trials) (Figure 2). Also contrary to our expectation there was no reliable systematic interaction 
between counting conditions and target detection on mean P300 amplitude (F(1,10) = 1.5, p = 
0.25, ges = 0.004). 
The behavioral results showed that there are some differences regarding stimulus 
contrast between the experimental conditions. In particular, two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA on the contrast levels showed the main effect for target detection that could have an 
effect on the EEG analyses described above. To diminish the effects of this potential 
confound a trial matching procedure was implemented. To equalize counting conditions per 
subject, matched sets of seen and unseen trials were constructed in a way that each set would 
have exactly the same contrast level for both seen and unseen conditions. Each of these sets 
was selected randomly according to the minimum number of unseen responses over all 
blocks. For instance, if a participant had 10 unseen trials in any block and at the same time it 
was subject's lowest score over all blocks, and then 10 trials from each block from each 
condition were used for the matched sets for that participant. In this procedure, only trials 
with the same contrast level between seen and unseen trials were included in the respective 
conditions. As a result all four (count seen/ seen, count seen/ unseen, count unseen/ seen, 
count unseen/ unseen) conditions always comprised an equal number of trial sets (seen and 
unseen trials with the same contrast) for each subject on each iteration of the set matching 
procedure (m = 47, median = 48, SD = 11, range = 24 to 60). As a result, in this analysis we 
could be confident that there were no variations regarding stimulus contrast between the 
experimental conditions. 
Then, the same analyses were repeated with the matched sets. For the P300 
component the results remained the same. The main effect of counting condition was not 
significant (F(1,10) < 1.0) and the main effect of target detection was significant (F(1,10) = 
13.5, p = 0.004 , ges = 0.09). Similarly to what was found previously, there was no reliable 
systematic interaction between counting conditions and target detection on mean P300 
amplitude (F(1,10) < 1.0). Fig. 4 depicts the grand average ERP's for all four conditions after 
the trial matching procedure.  
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Figure 4. The grand average ERP's for all four conditions (count seen/ seen, count seen/ unseen, count unseen/ 
seen, count unseen/ unseen) after trial matching procedure. Again, the P300 is stronger for “seen” trials 
independently of the counting condition. 
 
The data collected did not reveal any impact of the counting task on P300 amplitude. 
Next we wanted to find out if previous trials had any effect on target detection or counting 
condition in the following trials. For instance, when subject counted unseen trials and had 
several unperceived trials in a row, the P300 component could have been feebler since there 
were no differences between these unperceived trials. Or having a perceived trial after an 
unperceived trial, while counting unseen trials, could have led to a stronger P300 signal due 
to a stronger working memory effect (as explained in the introduction).  
For this analysis, the first factor was counting condition (subject counted seen or 
unseen trials), the second factor was target detection (target seen/unseen on a given trial) and 
the third factor was target detection in previous trial (target seen/ unseen on the previous 
trial). The results remained largely unchanged: the main effect of counting condition was not 
significant (F(1,10) < 1.0), the main effect of target detection (F(1,10) = 8.9, p = 0.01 , ges = 
0.06) was significant and the main effect of target detection in previous trial (F(1,10) = 1.4, p 
= 0.27 , ges = 0.008) was not  significant. And all interactions were also not significant: all F 
values were smaller than 1.8 and all p values were higher than 0.21. Fig. 5 depicts the grand 
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average ERP's for all four conditions when subjects counted seen or unseen trials. The results 
showed that previous trials had no effect on subsequent trials. 
 
 
Figure 5. The grand average ERP's for all four conditions (previously seen/ seen, previously seen/ unseen, 
previously unseen/ seen, previously unseen/ unseen) when subjects counted seen (A) or unseen trials (B).  
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Discussion 
 
The aim of the study was to explore whether the P300 amplitude is a marker of 
conscious perception of a particular target or whether it rather reflects the consequences of 
conscious perception, such as working memory update. It was hypothesized that in the 
experiment where only a quartile of trials is associated with not perceiving the target and 
where the paradigm contains no discrimination task, a stronger P300 should be measured for 
not consciously perceived trials. Contrary to our expectation, P300 was still stronger for trials 
where the subjects consciously perceived the stimulus. Furthermore, we also could not 
replicate the previous results of Pitts and colleagues (2014a; 2014b), as there was no reliable 
systematic interaction between counting conditions and target detection on mean P300 
amplitude. Altogether, contrary to our expectation, the data collected support previous studies 
in which the P300 component is claimed to be a key signature of conscious access.   
 
Methodological considerations 
Why were the results different than expected? First, it is important to contemplate 
whether our specific implementation of the experimental paradigm could have included any 
confounding factor that in turn affected the outcome. 
In the study, every so often it was difficult for subjects to perceive the stimuli, as they 
frequently expressed tiredness during the experiment. Although there was a slight break after 
every 100 trials and a longer interval after 4 blocks to rest the eyes, the test was still 
challenging and difficult to carry out, as experiments on consciousness commonly are. Note, 
however, that all participants were recruited among the acquaintances of the experimenter 
and therefore had a strong coherence with the study. Also, their frame of mind was constantly 
assessed after every 100 trials and none of the subjects seemed frustrated during or after the 
experiment, rather opposite. Thus, we have reason to believe that their effort was sufficient. 
However, having such relatively difficult conditions for conscious perception might also 
imply that some of our manipulations were not effective. In particular, one of our goals was 
to make trials without conscious perception (the unseen trials) deviants. Although subjects 
had objectively relatively high amounts of seen trials, they reported difficulties perceiving the 
stimuli; hence obviously unseen trials were subjectively not so deviant after all. In hindsight 
one could conclude that it would have been better to have objectively different perceptual 
conditions for seen and unseen trials (e.g. by having different ISIs). Objectively different 
experimental conditions are of course associated with the problem that any differences 
DOES THE P300 REFLECT CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION OR ITS CONSEQUENCES?  
 
19  
between trials with and without conscious perception could be caused by such objective 
differences in stimulation (e.g. Bachmann, 2009). This problem can be alleviated by proper 
control conditions whose ERPs are subtracted from the ERPs of the experimental conditions 
(e.g. Pitts et al., 2014b). Future experiments should directly test this idea by making unseen 
trials perceptually and subjectively more deviant in the present experimental setup. It is not 
impossible that then the P300 would indeed be smaller for seen trials than for trials without 
conscious perception. 
Another aspect, which is worth pondering, is the role of attention. Research shows 
that people make more mistakes or perform their tasks more slowly when they have a dual-
task (Aru & Bachmann, 2009b), as attentional resources must be divided among all of the 
component tasks to perform them. In retrospect, some participants reported that they paid 
more attention to the counting task, since they felt it needed more attentiveness – missing one 
trial can lead to the false final score. Thus, their attention was mostly focused on additional 
counting task competing for limited resources. Concentrating on the counting task could have 
decreased the effects of our experimental manipulations. A serious shortcoming of the 
present experimental setup is that we had no condition where the subjects had no counting 
task. Hence, we cannot directly verify whether the counting task had an effect on our P300 
results. 
 
Comparison to the results of Pitts and colleagues 
Michael Pitts and colleagues (2014a; 2014b) have argued that P300 could be related 
to reporting the contents of consciousness. Their first study on this topic adapted the 
inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2014a) and found P300 reflecting the report 
about task-relevant stimuli. The results were achieved manipulating with visual awareness 
and task-relevance independently while having no additional task (e.g. counting task) beside 
target detection, as we had here in the present study. Briefly, the paradigm included three 
experimental phases. First, subjects followed a task-relevant stimulus while a task-irrelevant 
stimulus was also shown. After the first phase subjects were asked about the task-irrelevant 
stimulus and had to repeat the same task again. At that point, before the second phase of the 
experiment, all subjects were aware of the task-irrelevant stimulus but did not have to provide 
any information about that. Lastly, subjects were asked to follow the stimulus that had been 
task-irrelevant until then, so that it then became task-relevant. The results showed that P300 
was absent following consciously perceived but task-irrelevant stimuli and appeared only 
when these stimuli became directly relevant to complete the task. In contrast to the current 
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study, subjects in their experiment did not have to follow the additional task (counting task) 
to make either the perceived or the unperceived trials task-relevant. They simply reported 
about seeing the task-relevant stimuli while also perceiving the task-irrelevant stimuli. 
The experiment of Pitts et al. (2014a) provides evidence that P300 is a consequence of 
consciousness that reflects the report about task-relevant stimuli. However, it should be noted 
that subjects in their study might have ignored the task-irrelevant stimuli every now and then 
since the trial-by-trial assessment of awareness is not possible in the inattention paradigm. 
Therefore, one could argue that the experiment of Pitts et al (2014a) did not provide 
convincing data about the task-irrelevant conditions, as it is not known how often the subjects 
perceived the task-irrelevant stimulus.  
Another experiment designed by Pitts and colleagues (2014b) used a manipulation of 
awareness and task-relevance in a backward masking task to compare brain activity on aware 
and unaware conditions depending on task-relevance. In short, two different masking delays 
(stimulus durations) were used – one leading to 0% awareness and another to 100% 
awareness of stimulus. All three stimuli (task-relevant, task-irrelevant, control), identical with 
their previous study, were presented in turns within one block. Subjects had to press a 
response button whenever they perceived the task-relevant stimulus. The task-relevant 
stimulus varied by blocks; therefore, on separate blocks of trials the same stimulus was either 
task-relevant or task-irrelevant. All this allowed comparison of 4 types of trials, as well as our 
experiment did: aware/ task-relevant, aware/ task-irrelevant, unaware/ task-relevant and 
unaware/ task-irrelevant. As the P300 was very weak during the task-irrelevant conditions 
(Pitts et al., 2014b), these results agree with their previous study and support the claim that 
the P300 component is likely to reflect post-perceptual processes.   
This approach seems promising, but yet again, it follows the same concern: it is not 
known how often the subjects indeed perceived the task-irrelevant stimulus since they simply 
did not have to report that. One can agree that it is very likely that subjects indeed perceived 
the task-irrelevant stimuli. However, importantly, perception of the task-relevant and task-
irrelevant stimuli could have been qualitatively different: for the task-relevant stimuli 
subjects could have had a clear conscious percept whereas for task-irrelevant stimuli the 
experience could have been much more vague. Thus, the results about task-irrelevant 
conditions are rather conjectural and it is possible that the differences in the P300 still reflect 
differences in conscious perception. 
In contrast to the current study subjects in their experiment did not have a dual-task 
(e.g. counting task) to make either the perceived or the unperceived trials task-relevant. 
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Bearing this in mind, subjects in Pitts’ et al. (2014a; 2014b) studies might have had more 
attentional resources for the perceptual task.  
The second major difference to point out concerns the influence of decision making 
processes. In our experiment, subjects were required to respond whether they consciously 
perceived the target stimulus on each trial. Performing this task required a decision about 
perceiving or not perceiving the target stimulus, which in turn demanded significant 
attentional resource. Under some conditions, attention affects detection sensitivity (Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2009) and having a dual-task might have decreased the attentional effect on target 
detection. Also, in our experiment all stimuli were complicated to perceive whereas in the 
masking experiment of Pitts et al. (2014b) stimuli were either clearly visible or completely 
invisible. Hence, in their experiment subjects essentially had no decision to make about 
whether they perceived the stimulus or not. In our experiment, however, on most trials 
subjects had to ponder whether they consciously perceived the target or not. It is to be noted 
that our experimental paradigm is in this sense much more similar to the experimental 
paradigms usually applied to study the NCC. The main advantage of the current experimental 
setup is that subjects had to give answers about conscious perception on every single trial. 
Hence, we suggest future studies to test the present experimental setup while having 
objectively different perceptual conditions for seen and unseen trials. Making consciously 
perceived and not perceived trials objectively different would also eliminate the difficulties in 
decision making about seeing or not seeing the stimuli. This could be achieved by using two 
different ISIs - one leading to 0% awareness and another to 100% awareness (as Pitts et al., 
2014b did). And to deal with the concern of dual-task, one could use a different manipulation 
of task-relevance that would be less demanding on the attentional resources of the subjects. It 
is possible that with these adjustments, our experimental manipulations would reveal a 
stronger P300 for unseen trials.  
 
P300 as the component of consciousness 
One of the important goals in the scientific study of consciousness is to distinguish 
those brain signals (NCC) that are together necessary for a particular conscious percept from 
processes that precede or follow the conscious experience. “Experimental findings imply that 
most of the brain’s computations can be performed in a non-conscious mode, but that 
conscious perception is characterized by an amplification, global propagation and integration 
of brain signals” (Dehaene et al, 2014). In the light of this global neural workspace theory it 
is intuitive that conscious access would be associated with late electrophysiological events 
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such as the P300. Experimental evidence from the group of Stanislas Dehaene has supported 
this intuition. For example using the backward masking paradigm, Del Cul and colleagues 
(2007) found P300 component to be most likely associated with subjective perception, 
because its amplitude as a function of SOA (stimulus onset asynchrony) exhibited the same 
sigmoidal shape as the proportion of seen trials. Furthermore, when trials with and without 
conscious perception were compared, P300 was one of their significant difference at a fixed 
SOA (Del Cul et al., 2007).  
Subsequent works, however, have suggested that the P300 amplitude might rather 
reflect the consequences of conscious perception, such as working memory update, 
differences in attention, stimulus expectation, adaptation or storing in working memory (Aru 
et al., 2012). Some studies have even provided evidence to support this idea (Pitts et al., 
2014a; 2014b).  
Does the P300 component reflect consciousness of the target? The current study was 
designed to include the following methodological considerations to demonstrate that P300 
component is more likely related to the consequences of conscious perception than conscious 
perception itself: we used no discrimination task, always the same stimulus was presented 
and the additional task was given together with the target stimulus. Also, there were only 1/4 
of trials with no conscious perception of the target. 
Despite our efforts to disprove the claim that P300 is a key signature of conscious 
access, our results actually support the view that P300 is a marker of conscious perception. In 
this study, the P300 component was found to distinguish aware from unaware trials, and its 
amplitude was stronger when subjects consciously perceived the stimuli. As we set out to 
show that P300 is a consequence of conscious perception and failed, the results reported here 
contradict the proposal that the P300 reflects consequences of consciousness and are in line 
with the interpretation for P300 as it has been suggested in the global neural workspace 
theory. Further research needs to show whether the factors discussed above might have 
derailed us from our mission. 
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Käesolevaga kinnitan, et olen korrektselt viidanud kõigile oma töös kasutatud teiste 
autorite poolt loodud kirjalikele töödele, lausetele, mõtetele, ideedele või andmetele. 
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